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Abstract—We investigate the privacy amplification problem in
which Eve can observe the uniform binary source through a
binary erasure channel (BEC) or a binary symmetric channel
(BSC). For this problem, we derive the so-called expurgation
exponent of the information leaked to Eve. The exponent is de-
rived by relating the leaked information to the error probability
of the linear code that is generated by the linear hash function
used in the privacy amplification, which is also interesting in its
own right. The derived exponent is larger than state-of-the-art
exponent recently derived by Hayashi at low rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
In information theoretic key agreement problem [1], [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6], legitimate parties need to distill a secret key from
a random variable in the situation such that an eavesdropper
can access to a random variable that is correlated to the
legitimate parties’ random variable. The privacy amplification
is a technique to distill a secret key under the situation by using
a (possibly random) function [7]. The security of distilled key
is evaluated by various kinds of measures. In this paper, we
focus on the leaked information, which is the mutual infor-
mation between the distilled key and eavesdropper’s random
variable (the so-called strong security [8], [9]), because it is
the strongest notion among security criterion [4] (see also [10,
Appendix 3]).
The privacy amplification is usually conducted by using a
family of universal 2 hash functions [11]. In [7], Bennett et. al.
evaluated ensemble averages of the leaked information for
universal 2 families, and derived an upper bound on the leaked
information by using the Re´nyi entropy of order 2. In [12],
Renner and Wolf evaluated ensemble averages of the leaked
information for universal 2 families, and derived an upper
bound on the leaked information by using the smooth min-
imum entropy. In [10], Hayashi evaluated ensemble averages
of the leaked information for universal 2 families, and derived
a parametric upper bound on the leaked information by using
the Re´nyi entropy of order 1 + θ. Concerning the exponential
decreasing rate of the leaked information, the exponent derived
by Hayashi’s bound is state-of-the-art.
In noisy channel coding problem, the exponential decreasing
rate of the error probability is also regarded as an important
performance criterion of codes, and has been studied for a
long time. The best exponent at high rates is the one derived
by Gallager’s random coding bound [13]. However, Gallager’s
exponent is not tight in general, and can be improved at low
rates because the random code ensemble involves some bad
codes and those bad codes become dominant at low rates. The
improved exponent by expurgating those bad codes is usually
called the expurgation exponent [13], [14]. Similar improved
exponents are also known in the context of the Slepian-Wolf
coding [15], [16] or the quantum error correction [17].
The purpose of this paper is to show a security analog
of above results, i.e., to derive an improved exponent of the
leaked information in the privacy amplification at low rates.
For this purpose, we concentrate our attention on the case such
that the random variable possessed by the legitimate parties is
the binary uniform source and the function used in the privacy
amplification is a linear matrix.
We first consider the case such that the eavesdropper’s
random variable is generated via a binary erasure channel
(BEC). For this case, we first relate the leaked information
to the maximum likelihood (ML) decoding error probability
of the linear code whose generator matrix is the one used in the
privacy amplification. Then an improved exponent is derived
by using the result of the expurgation exponent of linear codes.
It should be noted that a similar approach to relate the
leaked information to the erasure error correction has been
appeared in [18]. However in this paper, we directly relate
the leaked information to the ML decoding error probability,
which enables us to derive the improved exponent. It should
be also noted that the approach in this paper is completely
different from the error correction approach conventionally
used to prove the so-called weak security and the problem
pointed out in [19] does not apply to our approach.
Next, we consider the case such that the eavesdropper’s
random variable is generated via a binary symmetric channel
(BSC). For this case, the technique used in the BEC case
cannot be directly applied. Thus, we first reduce the BSC
case to the BEC case by using the partial order between
BSCs and BECs. The reduction turns out to be quite tight.
Indeed, the exponent derived via this reduction is as good as
Hayashi’s exponent below the critical rate, and strictly better
than Hayashi’s exponent below the expurgation rate, which
resemble the relation between the expurgation exponent and
the random coding exponent of the noisy channel coding. Our
results suggest that the privacy amplification with a universal
2 family is not necessarily optimal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first
explain the problem formulation of the privacy amplification in
Section II. Then, we consider the BEC case and the BSC case
in Sections III and IV respectively. Conclusions are discussed
in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let (Xn, Zn) be a correlated i.i.d. source with distribution
PXZ . The alphabet is denoted by X ×Z . In the privacy ampli-
fication problem, we are interested in generating the uniform
random number on Sn by using a function fn : Xn → Sn.
The joint distribution of the generated random number and the
side-information is given by
PSnZn(sn, z
n) =
∑
xn∈f−1n (sn)
PnXZ(x
n, zn),
where f−1n (sn) = {xn ∈ Xn : fn(xn) = sn}.
The security is evaluated by the leaked information
I(fn) = I(Sn;Z
n)
where I(·; ·) is the mutual information and we take the base
of the logarithm to be e.
For given rate R ≥ 0, we are interested in the exponential
decreasing rate of I(fn), i.e.,
E(R;X |Z)
= sup
{
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log I(fn) : lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Sn| ≥ R
}
.
In the privacy amplification problem, we typically use the
universal 2 hash family.
Definition 1: A family Fn of functions fn : Xn → Sn is
called universal 2 if
Pr{Fn(x
n) = Fn(xˆ
n)} ≤
1
|Sn|
for every xn 6= xˆn, where Fn is the uniform random variable
on Fn.
For parameter θ, let
ψ(θ;X |Z) = − log
∑
x,z
PZX(x, z)
1+θPZ(z)
−θ
= − log
∑
x,z
PXZ(x, z) exp
[
θ logPX|Z(x|z)
]
.
Hayashi derived the following lower bound on E(R;X |Z).
Proposition 2 ([10]): For any universal 2 hash family Fn,
we have
E(R;X |Z) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
logEFn [I(fn)]
≥ Er(R;X |Z)
:= max
0≤θ≤1
[ψ(θ;X |Z)− θR] ,
where EFn means the average over randomly chosen function
from Fn.
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Fig. 1. The channel considered in
Section III.
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Fig. 2. The virtual channel con-
sidered in Section III.
III. SIDE-INFORMATION VIA BINARY ERASURE CHANNEL
In this section, we assume that X is the uniform binary
source and Z is the output of the binary erasure channel
(BEC) with erasure probability ε, i.e., PXZ(x, x) = 1−ε2 and
PXZ(x, ?) =
ε
2 , where ? represent the erasure symbol (see
Fig. 1). For given sequence zn, let J (zn) ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be
the set of those indices such that zj =?. When the sequence
zn is obvious from the context, we abbreviate J (zn) as J .
In the rest of this paper, we concentrate on the linear
function fn : Xn → Sn. Thus, we implicitly assume that
X = F2 and Sn = Fk2 for some k, where F2 is the field
of order 2. Let Mn be k × n matrix with entries in F2. We
consider function fn : xn → xnMTn and the security criterion
is denoted by I(Mn). The sequence xnJ is a subsequence of
xn that consist of the indices in J , and the matrix MJ is a
sub-matrix of Mn that consist of the columns in J .
The following lemma was presented by Ozarow and Wyner.
Lemma 3 ([20]): We have
H(Sn|Z
n = zn) ≥ rank(MJ (zn))
for every zn.
We consider the virtual BEC with erasure probability 1− ε
(see Fig. 2), i.e., PY |X(x|x) = ε and PY |X(?|x) = 1 − ε.
From Lemma 3, we have the following.
Theorem 4: Let Cn be the linear code whose generator
matrix is Mn, and let PML(Cn, 1 − ε) be the maximum
likelihood decoding error probability1 of the code Cn over the
BEC(1− ε). Then, we have
I(Mn) ≤ nPML(Cn, 1− ε).
Proof: Let mk ∈ Fk2 is a message to be sent, and the
encoded message mkMn is sent over the BEC(1−ε). Suppose
that the received signal is yn. If rank(MJ (yn)c) = k, then the
ML decoder output mk, where J (yn)c = {1, . . . , n}\J (yn)
is the non erased bits. On the other hand, if rank(MJ (yn)c) <
k, there are plural messages that are compatible with yn, and
thus the ML decoder fail to output mk. Therefore, the ML
decoding error probability can be written as
PML(Cn, 1− ε)
=
∑
J c⊂{1,...,n}
(1 − ε)n−|J
c|ε|J
c|
1[rank(MJ c) < k].
1Ties are counted as errors.
On the other hand , by using Lemma 3 and by noting that
H(Sn) ≤ n, we have
I(Mn) ≤ n
∑
J⊂{1,...,n}
(1− ε)n−|J |ε|J |1[rank(MJ ) < k].
Thus, we have the assertion of the theorem.
By using a linear code achieving the Gilbert-Varshamov
bound, we have the following.
Corollary 5: There exists a linear function fn : xn →
xnMTn such that
E(R;X |Z)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log I(fn) (1)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
logPML(Cn, 1− ε) (2)
≥ Ex(R, 1− ε) (3)
:= max
θ≥1
[
θ{log 2−R− log(1 + (1− ε)1/θ)}
]
. (4)
Proof: First note that the error probability of the chan-
nel coding and that of Slepian-Wolf coding (with full side-
information) are the same for linear code and BEC. Thus,
Csisza´r’s linear Slepian-Wolf code result [16] implies that
there exists a code satisfying
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
logPML(Cn, 1− ε)
≥ min
H(W )≥log 2−R
[
(log 2−R)−H(W ) +
E
[
− log
∑
x,y
√
PXY (x, y)PXY (x+W, y)
]]
= min
h(p)≥log 2−R
[−p log(1 − ε) + (log 2−R)− h(p)] ,
(5)
where we set PW (1) = p. Since the objective function of
Eq. (5) is convex, by introducing
L(λ) := min
p
[−p log(1− ε) + (1 + λ)(log 2−R− h(p))]
for λ ≥ 0, Eq. (5) can be written [21] as
max
λ≥0
L(λ).
By changing the variable as θ = 1 + λ, Eq. (5) can be also
written as
max
θ≥1
L(θ − 1) = max
θ≥1
[
θ{log 2−R− log(1 + (1 − ε)1/θ)}
]
.
Note that Ex(R, 1 − ε) is the expurgation exponent for
BEC(1− ε) [22].
Remark 6: It should be noted that
Er(R;X |Z)
= Er(R, 1− ε) (6)
:= max
0≤θ≤1
[
− log
{
(1− ε) +
1
2θ
ε
}
− θR
]
. (7)
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Fig. 3. Comparison of Er(R, 1− ε) (dashed line) and Ex(R, 1− ε) (solid
line) for ε = 0.5.
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Fig. 4. The channel considered in
Section IV.
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Fig. 5. The virtual channel con-
sidered in Section IV. This channel
is less noisy than the BSC in Fig. 4.
Since Er(R, 1−ε) is the random coding exponent for BEC(1−
ε) [22], Hayashi’s exponent can be also derived from Theorem
4.
From Eq. (3) and Eq. (6) and known facts on the exponents,
we find that the exponent of PA in Corollary 5 is larger than
that in Proposition 2 for low R. These exponents are compared
in Fig. 3 for ε = 0.5. We find that Ex(R, 1 − ε) is strictly
larger than Er(R, 1− ε) at low rates.
IV. SIDE-INFORMATION VIA BINARY SYMMETRIC
CHANNEL
In this section, we assume that X is the uniform binary
source and Z is the output of the binary symmetric channel
(BSC) with crossover probability ε, i.e., PXZ(x, x) = 1−ε2
and PXZ(x, x + 1) = ε2 (see Fig. 4). Let Z¯ be the output
of BEC(4ε(1− ε)) with input X . Since BEC(4ε(1− ε)) (see
Fig. 5) is less noisy than BSC(ε) [23], we have
I(Sn;Z
n) ≤ I(Sn; Z¯
n).
Thus, Corollary 5 can be applied to the case considered in this
section.
Theorem 7: Let Z¯ be the output of BEC(4ε(1 − ε)) with
input X . Then, we have
E(R;X |Z) ≥ E(R;X |Z¯)
≥ Ex(R, 1− 4ε(1− ε)).
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Fig. 6. Comparison of Er(R,X|Z) (dashed line) and Ex(R, 1−4ε(1−ε))
(solid line) for BSC(0.11).
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Fig. 7. Comparison of Er(R,X|Z) (dashed line) and Ex(R, 1−4ε(1−ε))
(solid line) for BSC(0.25).
Hayashi’s exponent for BSC(ε) is
Er(R;X |Z) = max
0≤θ≤1
[
− log
{
(1− ε)1+θ + ε1+θ
}
− θR
]
.
The exponents are compared in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 for ε = 0.11
and 0.25 respectively.
Let Rcr(ε) be the critical rate, i.e., the largest rate such that
the optimization in Er(R;X |Z) is achieved by θ = 1. Then,
for R ≤ Rcr(ε), we have
Er(R;X |Z) = − log{(1− ε)
2 + ε2} −R.
On the other hand, let Rx(ε) be the expurgation rate, i.e., the
smallest rate such that the optimization in Ex(R, 1−4ε(1−ε))
is achieved by θ = 1. Then, for Rx(ε) ≤ R, we have
Ex(R, 1− 4ε(1− ε))
= log 2−R− log (1 + 1− 4ε(1− ε))
= − log{(1− ε)2 + ε2)} −R.
Thus, for Rx(ε) ≤ R ≤ Rcr(ε), Er(R;X |Z) = Ex(R, 1 −
4ε(1− ε)), which can be also observed in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7.
We also find that Ex(R, 1− 4ε(1− ε)) is strictly larger than
Er(R;X |Z) at low rates.
V. CONCLUSION
For the BEC case and the BSC case, we derived the
expurgation exponent of the leaked information in the privacy
amplification. The technique to relate the leaked information to
the ML decoding error probability heavily relies on the specific
structure of the BEC. Thus, to derive the expurgation exponent
for general cases, a method to expurgate bad functions directly
might be needed.
Hayashi derived a quantum counter part of Proposition 2 in
[24]. It is also interesting to derive the expurgation exponent
in the privacy amplification for quantum adversary. For the
case such that the eavesdropper’s information is generated via
the complementary channel of a Pauli channel, the technique
to relate the leaked information to the ML decoding error
probability is already known [25]2, and it is not difficult
to derive the expurgation exponent. In general, more refined
technique is needed. These topics will be investigated in
elsewhere.
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